Webhook HMAC Signer
Sign and verify GitHub, Stripe, and Slack webhook signatures locally.
OpenRead a token the way an attacker would, with plain-language notes on each weakness.
Decode header and payload entirely in-browser.
Educational flags for alg=none, missing exp, and odd claims.
iat/nbf/exp are shown in human-readable time.
Paste JWKS JSON to list key ids - no cracking.
A partner integration hands you sample access tokens, and before you trust them in your gateway you want to know what they reveal and how they are built. Is the algorithm pinned, do they expire, and is there anything in the payload that should never have been there?
Paste a token, with or without the Bearer prefix. Header and payload are decoded side by side, and a timeline shows iat, nbf and exp in UTC with relative times. Findings cover the header (alg none, HMAC algorithms that let every verifier mint tokens, unrecognized algorithms, a missing kid on asymmetric tokens, jku or x5u URLs a verifier might fetch, crit), the claims (missing or expired exp, lifetimes over 24 hours, future iat or nbf, missing iss, aud, iat or jti), claim names that suggest secrets or personal data, and tokens above 4 KB. The score starts at 100 and loses 20 per failure and 8 per warning.
Tick Compare against a JWKS and paste a key set to confirm the token's kid exists there and that the key's declared alg matches the header. The signature itself is never verified, by design, so no signing secret has to enter the page. When you do want a signature check on an HS256 token, use JWT Verify. The article on decoding JWTs without cloud debuggers explains why pasting production tokens into hosted tools is a habit worth breaking.
Decoding and the review both run inside this page, and the report can be copied or downloaded as jwt-review.txt.
Keyboard shortcut
Answers for this tool. For site-wide help, open the FAQ hub.
With HMAC, every service that can verify the token holds the same secret and could therefore issue tokens too. That is fine for a single service, but across several services an asymmetric algorithm such as RS256 or ES256 keeps signing with the issuer alone.
Names containing words such as password, secret, api_key, ssn, phone, address or date_of_birth. The match is on the key name only, so a harmless field with a suspicious name can trigger it, and a secret under a bland name will not.
It is reported as a failure because a verifier would normally refuse the token. Either the key has rotated out of the set, or the token was issued by someone else.